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Abstract 
This paper provides novel evidence on the role of income taxes for residential rents 
and spatial sorting. Drawing on comprehensive apartment-level data, we identify 
the effects of tax differentials across municipal boundaries in Switzerland. The 
boundary discontinuity design (BDD) corrects for unobservable location 
characteristics such as environmental amenities or the access to public goods and 
thereby reduces the estimated response of housing prices by one half compared to 
conventional estimates: we identify an income tax elasticity of rents of about 0.26. 
We complement this approach with census data on local sociodemographic 
characteristics and show that about one third of this effect can be traced back to a 
sorting of high-income households into low-tax municipalities. These findings are 
robust to a matching approach (MBDD) which compares identical residences on 
opposite sides of the boundary and a number of further sensitivity checks. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
s
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
ht
tp
s:
//
do
i.
or
g/
10
.7
89
2/
bo
ri
s.
14
35
45
 
| 
do
wn
lo
ad
ed
: 
13
.5
.2
02
0
1 Introduction
Location decisions of individuals depend among others on neighborhood at-
tributes as well as on the bundle of taxes and public goods offered by local
governments. Tiebout (1956) pointed out that mobile citizens weigh the
costs and benefits of public goods provided at the local level and thereby
induce competition among municipalities and regions that ultimately yields
an efficient provision of public goods and a sorting of households according to
their preferred bundles. Even with a relatively small number of mobile, well
informed individuals who vote by feet the mechanism should reflect in hous-
ing prices. A marginal difference in local taxes between two municipalities
providing the same quality of public goods capitalizes in the price for housing
as residents have to be compensated for an increase in taxes by a decline in
housing prices. Apart from this direct effect, tax differentials are likely to in-
duce a sorting of households across jurisdictions because rich households have
a relatively stronger preference for low taxes than poor households if taxes
are progressive or preferences are non-homothetic (see Schmidheiny, 2006a).
Accordingly, low-tax jurisdictions are characterized by higher incomes which
raises housing prices further.
The empirical relevance of these intuitive mechanisms plays an important
role for the local provision of public goods and the optimal design of fiscal
federalism. On the one hand, a high elasticity of housing prices with respect
to local taxes implies a high degree of mobility and consequently, competition
among local governments. This should prevent a misuse of public funds. On
the other hand, a high tax elasticity points to the limitations of fiscal decen-
tralization because local income taxes may not be used for redistributional
policies and expenditures for goods producing inter-jurisdictional spillovers
may be too low (see e.g. Gordon, 1983). Moreover, as pointed out by Hilber
(2011) the extent to which fiscal variables capitalize into local housing prices
has important implications for the evaluation of a wide range of policies. For
instance, a high degree of capitalization may have adverse consequences for
intergovernmental aid or tax deductions.
This paper’s contribution is twofold: first, we identify the causal effect
of local income taxes on the costs of housing and second, we isolate the role
played by sociodemographic sorting. Our analysis draws on a unique micro-
geographic dataset which covers detailed information on the universe of 3.5
million rental advertised residences over the period 2005–2012 and across
almost all Swiss municipalities. Due to the large degree of regional autonomy
which allows municipalities to charge different income taxes, Switzerland
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is often referred to as a prime example for fiscal federalism. We match
the apartment level information with census data about sociodemographic
characteristics of individual households.
Estimating the response of housing prices to tax changes is complicated
by the fact that capitalization of taxes is conditional on the quality of lo-
cal public goods and services which cannot be measured in a satisfactory
way. Moreover, the spatial income distribution and the level of local taxes
are determined simultaneously because a larger tax base allows for lower
tax rates. This is particularly relevant as (income) sorting may arise for
various other reasons than taxes. For instance, households being similar in
terms of sociodemographic characteristics such as income, education, or cul-
tural background tend to cluster because of environmental and neighborhood
amenities as well as social interactions (Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan, 2007;
Bayer and McMillan, 2012). Likewise, the distance to the central business dis-
trict (CBD) matters because different types of households value commuting
costs differently. Accordingly, sociodemographic variables are intrinsically
correlated with unobservable location attributes as well as local taxes. As
a consequence the identification of the tax elasticity is hardly convincing in
conventional hedonic regression.
We address these endogeneity problems using a boundary discontinuity
design and compare residences in a very close neighborhood on both sides
of a municipal boundary. Under the assumption that the distribution of
potentially confounding variables changes continuously, we can hold local
amenities as well as household preferences over neighborhood attributes and
public goods constant and use the jump in the income tax across municipal
boundaries to identify the marginal willingness to pay for living in a low-
tax community. The precise georeferencing of households and apartments
allows us to analyze the variation in rents as well as in sociodemographic
and apartment characteristics within a narrow distance band from the mu-
nicipal boundaries. Features of geographical attractiveness certainly vary
continuously just as the crime rate, and the population density. Likewise,
the access to infrastructure and other non-excludable public goods and ser-
vices are continuous functions of distance. Building on Schmidheiny (2006a),
we embed our approach in a sorting framework and quantify the degree of
income sorting caused by tax differences. This enables us to to disentangle
the direct capitalization of taxes in housing prices from the indirect effect
caused by sociodemographic sorting.
Our results provide strong support for a capitalization of income taxes
in rents and housing prices. We show that the average elasticity of annual
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rents with regard to annual income taxes is about 0.26. However, conven-
tional hedonic regressions would suggest a much higher rate of about 0.54.
Accordingly, unobservable preferences about local public goods and neigh-
borhood characteristics that offset the effect of higher taxes are decisive and
reduce the estimated elasticity by almost one half. Further accounting for so-
ciodemographic characteristics, we show that roughly one third of the higher
rents in low-tax municipalities can be attributed to a sorting a high-income
households.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
literature on taxes and housing prices before we introduce the institutional
background in Section 3. Section 4 presents the data and in Section 5 we
derive an empirical model for inference about the effect of local income taxes
on rents. We describe our key results in Section 6 and perform numerous
sensitivity checks in Section 7. The last section concludes with a summary
of the key findings.
2 Local taxes and housing prices
Following Oates (1969) there has been ample empirical research on the effect
of taxes on property values, but as a matter of the design of tax institutions in
the majority of countries, most authors have studied the effect of local prop-
erty taxes on housing prices (see Ross and Yinger, 1999 and Hilber, 2011
for excellent overviews) while empirical evidence regarding local differences
in income taxes and their link to housing prices can hardly be obtained (ex-
ceptions are Morger, 2013 and Stull and Stull, 1991).1 Most of these studies
follow the standard hedonic approach to estimate the valuation of housing
characteristics and local amenities which however is prone to endogeneity
bias resulting from unobservables. Accordingly, in order to address these is-
sues the distinction of possible sources for differences in taxation is essential.
These include the variation in household preferences, the efficiency of public
goods provision, and the size of the tax base (Schmidheiny, 2006b).
Different tax rates between municipalites may lead to rent differentials
via the following channels. First, there is a direct effect as disposable in-
come increases with lower taxes. Second, tax savings increase with income
1Further empirical tests of Tiebout’s sorting mechanism with regard to changes in envi-
ronmental quality and schooling are manifold (e.g., Banzhaf and Walsh, 2008; Rothstein,
2006). For a discussion of the estimation of housing prices and demand see Sheppard
(1999).
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and accordingly high-income individuals have a higher willingness to pay for
housing in the low-tax municipality. With inelastic supply high-income indi-
viduals outbid lower income individuals which results in income sorting across
municipalities. Third, fixed migration costs imply that high-income individ-
uals are more responsive to tax differences. Suppose there was an exogenous
shock to the tax difference between two municipalities. In accordance with
the channels described above, this will boost the demand for housing in the
low-tax municipality. Yet, there are potential feedback mechanisms on local
taxes because a favorable selection of high-income citizens allows for the pro-
vision of a given level of public goods at lower tax rates. Similarly, the new
selection of citizens may change the set of municipal preferences and strive
for a lower level of government expenditures which will further reduce taxes.
The sorting process outlined above is likely to be incomplete once het-
erogeneous preferences are taken into account. Conversely, complete income
stratification would occur if household preferences varied only over income
(see e.g., Epple and Platt, 1998; Epple and Sieg, 1999). For instance, house-
holds may self-segregate in the sense that individuals prefer to locate close
to other households with similar characteristics. This can explain the clus-
tering of household types within municipalities and across municipal bound-
aries (Ioannides, 2004). Moreover, individuals may freeride on externalities
that local neighborhoods generate across boundaries or exhibit heterogeneous
preferences over local public goods. An example for the latter is the relation-
ship between housing prices and schooling quality that has been subject to
previous empirical work using similar identification strategies (see, e.g. Bayer,
Ferreira, and McMillan, 2007; Black, 1999; Fack and Grenet, 2010; Gibbons,
Machin, and Silva, 2013). Similar to these studies showing that the inclusion
of neighborhood effects reduces the coefficient of school quality in hedonic re-
gressions, we find that disregarding local unobservables produces an upward
bias in the elasticity of housing prices with regard to income taxes. More-
over, we show that income sorting explains a considerable part of the effect.
Empirical evidence in favor of incomplete income sorting in Switzerland is
found in Hodler and Schmidheiny (2006), Schmidheiny (2006a), and Schal-
tegger, Somogyi, and Sturm (2011). With incomplete sorting and moving
costs income taxes should not fully capitalize in housing prices.
In general, these sources of tax variation raise severe endogeneity prob-
lems due to unobserved heterogeneity. Previous work has not been able to
account for both the variation in neighborhood characteristics that may re-
flect individual preferences about the level and quality of public goods and
the local variation in income taxes. Utilizing an institutional background
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that leads to local differences in income taxes together with detailed georef-
erenced data on individual rental prices, apartment types and sociodemo-
graphic characteristics we are able to assess the effects of income taxes on
housing prices taking spatial sorting into account.
3 Institutional background: taxes, public goods
and housing prices in Switzerland
By the Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, both the federal state and
the 26 cantons (which are similar to U.S. States and German Bundesla¨nder)
are fiscal jurisdictions. It is noticeable that cantons have the main tax au-
thority and the federal state’s right to levy taxes is limited both in duration
and extent. In practice, cantonal law delegates the authority to levy taxes
to the municipalities such that all three state levels – the federal state, the
cantons, and the municipalities – are tax jurisdictions, i.e., they set their own
tax rates and levy their own income taxes. Elements of direct democracy are
pronounced and thus tax rates are set periodically by referenda.2 While the
federal government levies the highest share of total tax revenue (45%), it
relies mostly on indirect taxes and income taxes amount to only 15% of its
revenue. On the other hand, cantons and municipalities, accounting for 33%
and 23% of the total tax revenue respectively, mainly impose direct taxes
such as income taxes, which account for 60% of the cantonal and for 70%
of the municipal revenue. The shares in total expenditures are 33%, 41%,
and 22%, for the federal, cantonal, and municipal level, respectively.3 In
particular, the Swiss Constitution allows cantons to set their own income
tax schemes, including the degree of tax progression. As a consequence, the
heterogeneity across cantons is large. Notably, municipalities have to set
their tax rates as a flat multiple of the cantonal rate such that progression is
homogeneous within cantons.
The unique combination of institutional characteristics leads to hous-
ing prices that are endogenously determined through differences in income
2The local (legislative) tax-setting authorities are usually the cantonal parliaments and
the municipality councils but exceptions (including compulsory referenda) exist. Tax rates
are determined annually in most cantons.
3All figures refer to the year 2011 and stem from the Swiss Federal Finance Admin-
istration (EFV). Fiscal revenue shares are based on figures for the three levels (federal,
cantonal, municipal). Expenditures include fiscal transfers and social security accounts
for the remaining 4% of total expenditures.
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taxes across jurisdictions that can be traced back exclusively to heteroge-
nous preferences and income sorting. The reasons are as follows: first, inter-
jurisdictional competition is limited through systems of federal and cantonal
fiscal equalization schemes in practice. Second, as pointed out by Hodler
and Schmidheiny (2006), a minimum level and quality of public goods pro-
vision is regulated by (mostly) cantonal law. For instance, teacher salaries
and school class size are determined by the cantons and tutoring is limited
on the basis of equality considerations, hence not only the level but also the
quality of schooling is sufficiently homogeneous. Note also that secondary
education (starting at age 13) and tertiary education are completely deter-
mined at the cantonal level. Third, the large degree of regional autonomy
gives rise to yardstick competition as tax rates are set by referendum, rul-
ing out large-scale inefficiencies as a source of differences in income taxes.
Finally, the Swiss tenancy law is flexible and accordingly, rents can usually
be adjusted at least once a year.4 In the following section we illustrate the
spatial differences that prevail both regarding the tax rates and rents across
cantons and municipalities.
4 Data
We use three data sources that are combined with geographic information
about Switzerland. First, the data on housing prices comprise about 3.5 mil-
lion postings of residences offered for rent during the period 2005-2012. These
data stem from comparis.ch which is the most widely-used price comparison
service in Switzerland offering among others information on real estate, in-
surance, and phone contracts. For their real estate platform comparis.ch
collects all offers posted on the 17 most popular apartment search engines in
the Swiss market. According to official statistical sources, the total number
of (owned and rented) apartments was 4,131,342, and the number of inhab-
ited apartments was 3,534,508 in 2011, thus the number of vacancies was
about 600,000.5 The number of unique observations in the same year cov-
ered by our sample is about the same. These figures indicate that the data
coverage of our sample is excellent. Our data also reflect the distribution of
residences across different categories very well. The median apartment in our
4In most cases, rents can be adjusted on first April and first October in any year.
The law allows an adjustment to rents customary in a place (allowing for local differences
within municipalities) regarding existing and new tenants.
5Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office (BFS).
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data has 3.5 rooms and a living space of about 80 square meters. Regarding
the geographic distribution of postings across cantons we observe a strong
concentration of observations (about 20%) in the Canton of Zurich which
is approximately consistent with the population share. In 2011, about 18
% of the Swiss population lived in the Canton of Zurich. In addition, the
data provide a good coverage of more rural areas such as the cantons Aargau
and Schwyz with 51,259 and 11,223 observations in 2011 (corresponding to
8.2% and 1.8% of the total) which fits approximately their population shares
of 7.7% and 1.9%.6 The overall distribution of residences in our sample is
shown in Figure 1.
– Figure 1 here –
All prices in the data at our disposal reflect offer prices rather than trans-
action prices. To account for the potential measurement error that might
arise from the difference between offer prices and transaction prices, we fo-
cus on rents rather than residential property prices.7 Immigration has been
an important factor that led to increasing demand for housing in recent years.
As a consequence, rents are almost never negotiated but taken as given by
the tenant. Moreover, real estate brokers offer residences online, in which
case the advertisement appears in the data at our disposal. In general, bro-
kers are very rare in this market because they are regulated to earn a flatrate
of 500 Swiss Francs (CHF) for matching a landlord and a customer. Impor-
tantly, the rental share is relatively high in Switzerland, amounting to 59%
in total inhabited accommodations in 2011.8 Migration costs are likely to be
lower for tenants than for property owners and thus capitalization should be
more pronounced. Finally, a recent study by Banzhaf and Farooque (2013)
for the Los Angeles area has shown that rents capture spatial differences in
contemporaneous amenities and income better than property prices.
Second, information on sociodemographic characteristics of individual
households is obtained from census data. It covers information on education,
employment status, occupation, age, legal status, native language, etc. The
6Population shares stem from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (BFS).
7Our dataset includes information on residential properties. Yet, we disregard these
data as we believe that the effect can be identified more precisely from rental prices.
8The residential property share in Switzerland is particularly low in comparison to
the neighboring countries (56.4% in Austria, 58.1% in France, 45% in Germany, 77.1%
in Italy). Sources: Swiss Federal Statistical Office (BFS), Euroconstruct 2013. The low
property share is mostly due to the fact that with the exception of Valais, individual
apartments could not be purchased until 1965.
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corresponding dataset was provided by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office
(BFS) and can be geolinked by precise addresses.9 We match the information
on real estate and sociodemographics to information about the geographic
location of municipal boundaries that stem from BFS, and to data on the mu-
nicipal tax burden, both spanning the period 2005–2012. The former allows
us to determine the municipality in which individual residences are located
as well as the distance from each residence to every municipal boundary in
every year. Annual maps are necessary because due to several reforms, the
number of municipalities diminished from 2,777 in 2005 to 2,495 in 2012.
Third, we calculate the local income tax burden depending on household
types and covering the years 2005-2012. Differences in tax legislation imply
that the calculation of the tax base varies across cantons (deductions from
gross income are set at the cantonal level). Applying the cantonal tax rate
which relies on a continuous and progressive tax schedule to the tax base
yields the so-called Einfache Steuer. This sets the basis for calculation of
the municipal and church taxes, with the corresponding flat tax rate usually
being defined in %. More specifically, the overall tax burden is calculated as
follows. We collected data on cantonal, municipal and church tax rates, and
on poll and school taxes if applicable for every municipality in all years as
well as the majority religious shares.10 We further use data from the Swiss
Federal Tax Administration (ESTV) on the total tax burden at the municipal
level. These data cover municipalities with at least 2,000 inhabitants until
2010 and all municipalities in later years. Using these data together with
the cantonal tax rates we infer the cantonal tax burden i.e., the Einfache
Steuer. With the cantonal tax burden and the municipal tax multipliers at
hand we obtain the municipal tax burden which is added to the cantonal
tax burden for all years. This computation is done by household status
and income, where we distinguish between single households and married
households with 2 children and income= {80; 100; 150; 200; 400} tsd. CHF.11
9We use the year 2000 as this is the last census which built on a questionnaire that the
entire population of Switzerland had to answer. Accordingly, it shows the demographic,
social, and economic developments at the finest possible spatial scale. Later censuses are
based on samples and data are available at the municipality level only for a few variables.
10The municipal tax multipliers are typically made available on the cantonal or municipal
webpages, and where not available we contacted the respective authorities for information.
The majority religious shares at the municipality level stem from the 2000 census. All
results are robust to using only the observations covered by ESTV data.
11More detailed information on the computation of the municipal tax burden is provided
in Appendix A.
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For reasons of consistency, we apply this approach to all municipalities
in all years and test the precision of our data by comparing the tax burden
stated by ESTV for municipalities with more than 2,000 inhabitants with
our own calculations. The fuzziness resulting from our calculations is minor.
Moreover, the ranking of municipalities in terms of their tax level is perfectly
matched by our computations and the negligible deviations in the absolute
tax burden are due to the tax authority using slightly different representative
characteristics for the computation of the tax base.12
– Figure 2 here –
In Figure 2 we display the total tax burden across all Swiss municipalities
using different colors for the quintiles of the distribution. We plot this map
for a single person with an annual income of 100 tsd. CHF in 2012. The
western part of Switzerland generally exhibits the highest taxes while the
central part levies relatively low taxes. Overall, we observe a large variation.
The minimum tax burden applies in the municipality of Wollerau (Schwyz)
and corresponds to 4,806 CHF while the highest tax burden applies in Les
Planchettes (Neuchaˆtel) and corresponds to 19,841. Interestingly, we observe
municipalities in the lowest quantile of tax burden (marked in light yellow)
right next to municipalities in the upper quantile of the distribution (marked
in dark blue). Many of these cases are municipality pairs belonging to dif-
ferent cantons but we find considerable variation within cantons, too. The
Canton of Graubu¨nden displays the largest variance in tax burden across
municipalities for our representative single person household with a range
of 4,997 (Rongellen) to 17,547 (Schmitten). We have plotted the distribu-
tion of municipal taxes in the Canton of Zurich separately in Panel B. Two
interesting observations are immediately evident from the map. First, the
most attractive locations at the lake side display very low taxes. Second, the
highest taxes are levied at the border of the canton relatively distant from
the agglomerations’ core.
– Figure 3 here –
How does the distribution of taxes relate to the distribution of rents? The
maps in Figure 3 plot the average rent per square meter in a municipality
12Contrasting the ESTV data about the tax burden for municipalities with more than
2,000 inhabitants with our own calculations yields a correlation coefficient of 0.98 and a
mean difference in the annual tax burden of only 0.6% of annual income across all cantons
and years. The results are robust to using data covered by ESTV only.
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for Switzerland and for the Canton of Zurich, respectively. Compared to the
tax burden, we observe less of a clear regional pattern in the distribution of
rents as the top quintile (marked in dark red) is scattered across western,
central and eastern Switzerland. Rents are highest in the agglomerations of
Zurich and Geneva but we find other municipalities in the upper quintile
in less agglomerated regions such as around Zug, Schwyz or in Graubu¨nden
(where taxes tend to be low). Focusing on the Canton of Zurich we observe
the highest rents in the lake-side municipalities and the lowest rents at the
cantonal borders which corresponds to the inverse of the distribution of taxes
as illustrated in Figure 2. Of course we cannot infer the effect of taxes on
the prices of housing from such unconditional correlations because of many
confounding factors that become evident from the maps. For instance, nu-
merous of the high-rent and low-tax municipalities in the Canton of Zurich
are located in the most attractive environment close to the lake and in com-
muting distance to the city center while the low-rent and high-tax regions
tend to be in the hinterland and offer less convenient public transport links
to the city. The municipalities with high rents and low taxes in Graubu¨nden
are located in some of the most popular tourist regions while municipalities
featuring low rents and relatively (yet not always) higher taxes tend to be
located in densely populated mountain areas.
5 Estimating the effect of income taxes on
housing prices
This paper’s empirical approach identifies the impact of income taxes on
rental prices based on a boundary discontinuity design as developed in Black
(1999) and Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007) and refined by Fack and
Grenet (2010) and Gibbons, Machin, and Silva (2013). In contrast to these
studies focusing on expenditure-side effects – or more precisely, on the val-
uation of schooling –, our analysis relates rental prices to public revenues.
Unobservable local conditions determine the level of taxes and rents at the
same time which implies that conventional hedonic housing prices regres-
sions yield biased estimates of the tax elasticity. With geographic location
commonly being acknowledged as the key determinant of housing prices it
seems advisable to pursue a counterfactual analysis based on observations
that share the same neighborhood characteristics. For instance, Albouy and
Ehrlich (Albouy and Ehrlich) conclude that space is a much greater deter-
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minant of land values than time even when studying data over the housing
boom and bust cycle. In urban economic theory and consistent with empiri-
cal evidence, the rent gradient typically decreases continuously with distance
from the economic center, publicly provided amenities, or other attractive
location fundamentals. In contrast, the tax burden changes discontinuously
at the municipal boundary in the multijurisdictional tax system of Switzer-
land. The analysis of narrow windows around spatial boundaries together
with boundary fixed effects can thus be exploited to obtain a causal effect of
income taxes on rents.13
5.1 Boundary discontinuity design (BDD)
Let us use the following notation. We observe postings of individual resi-
dences denoted by i in year t which belong to a municipality m ∈ M . Each
municipality levies an annual income tax Taxmt – which can vary across
household type and income level – from its residents. Using data on ad-
ministrative boundaries we can assign each municipality all its neighboring
municipalities. Restricting our dataset to posts with non-missing and plau-
sible values for the residence characteristics reported in Table 1, we obtain
M = 1, 989 municipalities.14 We denote by p = {m,m′} a pair of neigh-
boring municipalities where each combination of municipalities is considered
only once and each residence is uniquely assigned to one municipality pair
according to the minimum distance to the municipal boundary.
The log tax burden is denoted by τmt which refers to a gross income of
100 tsd. CHF and to a single person household in our benchmark specifica-
tions. This corresponds approximately to 1.5 times the median income of an
employee in Switzerland. In order to insure a sufficient degree of institutional
homogeneity we restrict the analysis to municipalities belonging to the same
canton. This implies that the results are not affected by the choice of income
13Note that this approach is similar but not equivalent to a spatial regression disconti-
nuity design, where identification is based on the continuity of distance as a running (or
forcing) variable; e.g., Lalive (2008), Dell (2010); see also Eugster and Parchet (2013),
Basten and Betz (2013), Egger and Lassmann (2013) for such designs for Switzerland. In
contrast to most spatial RDD, the distance from the boundary has no uniform economic
interpretation and we match individual residences on both sides of the boundary.
14This refers to the full time period. We assign the respective neighboring municipalities
for each year separately according to the corresponding classification and digital maps
of municipalities. As some municipal boundaries were modified over the period under
consideration we use separate digital maps for each year which are available from BFS.
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group because the progression of the tax code is constant within cantons.15
Likewise, we neglected the federal tax in the calculation of the tax burden
for the same reason. Yet, the responsiveness of households may depend on
household characteristics and accordingly we analyze the robustness of our
results for a representative family with two children.16
We use this information together with data on the log rent per square
meter at t of residence i located in m, to estimate the tax elasticity from a
conventional hedonic regression model of the following form as a baseline for
comparison:
rimt = η + ωτmt + ρt + uimt, (1)
where ρt is a set of year dummies and uimt is an error term that may be
clustered at the municipality-year level to take a general form of correlation
of observations within municipalities and over time into account.
To overcome the bias in ω that results from omitting relevant factors
that are correlated with income taxes but affect the outcome independently,
we determine for each municipality pair p the latitude and longitude for up
to B = 24 different border points b = {1, ..., B} using geographic informa-
tion system (GIS) data. The number of border points depends on the size
and the shape of the common boundary. Municipality pairs sharing a long
common boundary and those with a very wiggly boundary line are assigned
more border points.17 With the border points at hand, we compute for each
residence i the Euclidean distances Dimt(b) from all common border points
b ∈ B of the municipality pairs it belongs to. In the next step, we deter-
mine for each pair the three border points featuring the greatest density of
residences surrounding them. All other border points are dropped because
our approach requires a high density of observations at the threshold. Each
residence is uniquely assigned to one of the three remaining border points
using the minimum distance Dimbt = min{Dimt(b)}. Finally, outcome rimbt
15For two municipalities with the same degree of progression the ranking of tax burdens
between m and m′ remains the same over all income groups. This implies that the notation
can neglect indices referring to household types and income levels. The median gross
income of an employee was 67,500 CHF in Switzerland in 2012 (see BFS, 2012).
16We provide the results for annual incomes of 80, 150, 200 and 400 tsd. CHF for a single
household as well as for a representative family with two children in an online appendix.
All results are stable across different income categories.
17This procedure maximizes the number of residences i located in different municipalities
within a close neighborhood.
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is measured for each residence i located in municipality m and assigned to
border point b at year t.
This procedure allows us to estimate a BDD model which can be stated
as follows:
rimbt = α + βτmt + θbt + εimbt, (2)
where β measures the tax elasticity, θbt is the border-point- and year-specific
fixed effect that absorbs all variation specific to the neighborhood of the
border-point in both the cross-sectional and the time dimension, and εimbt is
an error term which we cluster at the boundary-year level to account for serial
correlation along boundaries that may be due to both spatial correlation and
correlation over time.18 By limiting the sample to residences within a small
neighborhood of the border-points we ensure that θbt accurately captures
location-specific unobservables.
5.2 Matching residences across boundaries (MBDD)
As an alternative approach, we follow Fack and Grenet (2010) and Gibbons,
Machin, and Silva (2013) and match each posting i on one side of b in m
with a counterfactual i′ on the other side of b in m′. The counterfactual
transaction ri′m′bt is calculated as the distance-weighted geographic mean of
the prices of all transactions j that took place within a certain radius and
in the same year as transaction i but were located in municipality m′ rather
than in m:
ri′m′bt =
J∑
j=1
1
Dij∑J
j=1
1
Dij
rjm′bt. (3)
Note that 1
Dij
refers to the inverse distance between a residence j and
reference sale i (both posted in the same year).19 Assuming that the ref-
erence transaction and the counterfactual are sufficiently close, they share
18Note that in general, a residence i that has n neighbors will be in n pairs and ac-
cordingly the error terms of all these n terms will be correlated. This correlation occurs
because the residence-specific error term enters the error of each pair. For this reason each
residence i is used only once. We assign each i a unique municipality pair according to
the minimum distance to the boundary.
19For the sake of computational ease, we use the inverse distance between postings i
and j via the border point. With many border points it can be shown that this yields
virtually the same values as computing direct distances.
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the same unobservable time-varying neighborhood effect and the regression
model (referred to as MBDD) becomes:
rimbt − ri′m′bt = γ(τmt − τm′t) + (imbt − i′m′bt). (4)
Parameter γ reflects the tax elasticity of rents and can be estimated by
regressing the price differential between reference and counterfactual rent on
the corresponding tax differential. Since the identification assumptions are
more likely to be valid for observations with a small distance, we estimate an
inverse-distance weighted model. We apply a weight
∑J
j=1
1
Dij
to each pair
{i, i′} such that observations in a close neighborhood receive more weight.
Standard errors are clustered at the boundary-year level to account for the
serial correlation in the error term induced by differencing. Note that this ap-
proach differs from the model in equation (2) by eliminating common spatial
trends through spatial differencing and by taking the distance between indi-
vidual residences at opposing sides of the boundary into account. Since we
pool the data over the years 2005-2012, we additionally allow for a common
time trend λt by including year dummies. While the tax burden differen-
tial varies across years, all municipalities within each pair in our boundary
sample generally offer the higher/lower tax rate over the full time period.
5.3 Discussion of the identifying assumptions
Under the assumption that unobservable determinants of rents vary contin-
uously at the boundary, the parameters β and γ identify the causal effect
of interest for observations in the vicinity of the boundary in the BDD and
MBDD approaches, respectively. We choose the radius from the municipal-
ity boundary such that it guarantees both the consistent estimation of the
coefficients of interest as well as sufficient precision. Hence, all estimates
are reported for three alternative bandwidths: we use samples of residences
located within 1 km, 600 meters, and 300 meters from the closest border
point. Note that municipality-pair-specific distances instead of border-point-
specific distances would be adequate to condition on the commuting costs to
the neighbor municipality but would not capture the local conditions of a
small well defined area: a residence i in m may be as close to the p-boundary
as a residence j located in neighboring municipality m′ but still i and j might
be distant from each other and located in environments of very different at-
tractiveness. In contrast, by way of the chosen design we condition on the
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proximity of residences i and j as well as on the proximity to the municipal
boundary in terms of their proximity to a common border point. Hence, this
approach allows us to hold neighborhood characteristics constant.
The resulting distribution of observations in space around individual bor-
der points is best described in a map as the one in Figure 4. The map
exemplifies for two neighboring municipalities, Ku¨snacht and Zollikon (Can-
ton of Zurich), how individual observations are allocated to and compared
across municipal border-points on a narrow spatial scale: the first type of
residences (green) is located at the lakeside, the second type (blue) is located
close to the centers and along main traffic routes, and the third type (red)
is located outside the center on the hill in both municipalities. Each of the
three border points will be assigned a unique fixed effect and the sample will
be restricted to observations within the bandwidth. Hence, using the 300
meter radius the red border point may not be used in the regressions due
to the low density of residences in the northern municipality. In order to
avoid differences in the sample composition of border points we restrict all
specifications to border points covered by the 300 meter boundary sample.20
The MBDD framework further improves on the continuity assumption as it
attributes a greater weight to those residence pairs that are closer than oth-
ers within each circle drawn in Figure 4. Specifically, we construct for each
dot in the southern part of the circle a counterfactual residence which is a
weighted average of the dots on the northern side of the boundary and within
the circle according to equation (3).
The identifying assumptions would be violated if we observed a bunch-
ing of residences and postings on the low (or high) tax side of the border.
A discontinuity in the density of the observations would point to a system-
atic difference in the supply of housing which is correlated with local taxes.
As suggested by McCrary (2008), we illustrate the density of our observa-
tions in equally sized bins of the distance from the boundary in the upper
left panel of Figure 5. Naturally, the frequency of postings decreases in the
close neighborhood of a municipality boundary which is due to residences
being concentrated in the center of a municipality. This process holds true
in treated and control municipalities and we observe an almost symmetric
shape of the histograms on both sides of the boundary. Even the immedi-
20The distance between municipalities may have implications for strategic tax setting.
Accordingly, border points/municipality pairs that enter the sample only for larger dis-
tances may be systematically different from others and we restrict our analysis to munic-
ipality pairs and border points that display a sufficiently high density of residences with
the smallest bandwidth.
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ate bins at both sides of zero distance have approximately the same density.
Hence, there is no indication of a bias toward more postings on either side
of the threshold.
– Figure 4 here –
Finally, our identification strategies rely on the assumption that estimates
of β and γ can be unambiguously attributed to the jump in the income tax.
If instead other factors varied discontinuously at b, our estimates could not
isolate the effect of taxes. It is not plausible to disentangle the effect of in-
come tax differences at cantonal borders from other political, economic and
institutional differences. For this reason we generally restrict our sample to
municipal boundaries which do no coincide with cantonal borders. Further
violations of the continuity assumption may include: (i) geographic barriers
that separate municipalities at b, (ii) apartment characteristics being system-
atically different in m and m′, (iii) asymmetric level and quality of excludable
public goods between municipalities, and (iv) individual preferences to live
at a particular address in central business districts.
We address these concerns in the following way: (i), we drop pairs that
are separated by rivers and highways or feature a difference in altitude of
more than 400 meters. In addition we drop pairs split by language borders.21
(ii), we account for apartment characteristics by using residuals obtained
from first-stage regressions of the log rent per square meter on a comprehen-
sive set of characteristics in all specifications.22 (iii), we exploit tax variation
within school districts in Section 7 because elementary schools are typically
financed on the municipal level. Other publicly provided goods such as health
services, roads, cultural events are either not municipality-specific, regulated
on the cantonal and federal level, or not exclusively limited to local residents.
In the latter case the usage costs become a continuous function of distance.
Identifying the effects only from tax rate variation over time – e.g. adding
municipality fixed effects – further supports this argument. In order to rule
21German, French, Italian, and Romansh are official languages in Switzerland. Lan-
guage borders are defined by the majority of the respective language speakers within
municipalities.
22These include the variables summarized in the next section, nonlinear and interaction
terms of them as well as year dummies. Moreover, all results remain very robust to
alternative specifications of the first-stage. In our preferred first-stage specification, we
explain about 15% of the variation in log rents. The corresponding regression tables are
displayed in an online appendix.
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out CBD specific effects (iv), we estimate equations (2) and (4) for obser-
vations that exclude the agglomerations of Basel, Bern, Geneva, Lausanne,
and Zurich separately.
6 Results
6.1 Descriptive statistics
In total we can assign about 2.5 million postings containing non-missing in-
formation on square meters, rents, and many other apartment characteristics
to the municipalities which we consider between the years 2005 and 2012.23
These include information about detailed characteristics of the residence as
listed for the full dataset in columns (1) and (2) of Table 1. Apart from age,
number of rooms, and the apartment’s floor these are binary variables that
capture information on the quality and type of the residence. We use the
following sociodemographic covariates: the shares of high- and low-income
population, of high- and low-skilled population, of foreigners, of unemployed,
of commuters, as well as the average age. These data are based on individual
information which is georeferenced and assigned to grids of 1× 1 km. Then,
we compute the respective shares and averages on the basis of the total popu-
lation within each grid. Income groups are constructed according to detailed
occupation categories and job functions. For details about the tax data and
the sociodemographic variables see Appendices A and B.
Regarding our identification strategy we resort to observations in the close
neighborhood of a municipal boundary. The boundary sub-sample (columns
(3) and (4) of Table 1) consists of residences that could be assigned to a
border point b which features at least 2 observations on both sides of the
boundary and within a distance of 300 meters. Accordingly, the municipality
composition remains stable when restricting the boundary sub-sample to
alternative maximum distances of 1 km and 600 meters. All border points
which correspond to geographic or linguistic barriers have been dropped.
Moreover, we drop municipality pairs with a tax differential of less than 100
CHF and we keep only residences that lie in a 1 × 1 km grid which has
a population of at least 50 individuals. The latter should ensure that the
23Note that we loose about one million of postings due the following reasons: First, we
drop observations with missing or non-credible information regarding rents, rooms, and
square meters. Second, we drop postings offering a rent of less than 5 CHF or more than
52 CHF per square meter. These values equal approximately the 1st and 99th percentiles.
18
sociodemographic information is representative of the neighborhood. Tax
burden and rents are measured in CHF where T S100m refers to the annual tax
burden of a single household earning 100 thousand CHF per year. In total the
boundary sub-sample consists of 151,011 postings in 211 municipalities. The
average rent per square meter amounts to 21.1 and and 22.2 CHF in the full
sample and the boundary sub-sample, respectively. Furthermore, the average
annual tax burden (T S100m ) is about 13,900 CHF in both samples. When
comparing the boundary sub-sample – which consists of only about 10% of
the total number of municipalities – to the full dataset, we observe that the
moments of the data are remarkably similar not only for the main variables
but also for the sociodemographic and residence covariates. The boundary
sample focuses on 190 border points with sufficiently close residences on both
sides of the boundary and 701 associated grid cells. Accordingly, a border
point is assigned on average about 800 observations and 3.6 grid cells (1× 1
km).
– Table 1 here –
Table 1 provides further information about the data. The average apart-
ment has about 3.5 rooms, is about 40 years old, and is located on the second
floor. More than 70% of the residences either have a balcony or a terrace and
40% have a parquet floor. The share of high-skilled is about 10% and the
share of foreigners amounts to about 23%. Overall, these figures seem rea-
sonable and representative. Limiting the sample with respect to a distance
of 600 and 300 meters from the closest border point results in samples of
89,058, and 30,980 observations, respectively. Within these distance bands,
the observed average rents are 21.8 CHF and 21.4 CHF. The figures for the
average annual income tax burden of our benchmark household with a gross
annual income of 100 thousand CHF amount to 14,113 CHF and to 14,202
CHF. In general, our dataset has a remarkable support at the border regions
which allows us to condition very precisely on the location of residences. This
is a feature of the data coverage, the relatively small size of municipalities,
and the high population density in Switzerland.
6.2 Graphical assessment of boundary discontinuities
In Figure 5 we illustrate the symmetry of the distribution of residences across
boundaries as described earlier, as well as the deviations in tax burden, rents
per square meter, and residual rents from the border-point averages for ob-
servations on the low- and high-tax side of each boundary. Note that we pool
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all border-points and structure the data such that high-tax municipalities are
assigned negative distances whereas low-tax municipalities have positive dis-
tances from the boundary. Moreover, the figures show local averages over
distance bins of 100 meters as well as flexible polynomial fits that were esti-
mated separately on both sides of the boundary.24 In each figure we restrict
the sample to a distance band of 1 km on either side of the boundary which
corresponds to the maximum bandwidth used in the estimations.
By construction, the difference in tax burden between municipalities on
opposite sides of the boundary features a discontinuity at the boundary (see
upper right panel of Figure 5). On average the difference between taxes
(T S100m in neighboring low- and high-tax municipalities is about 750 CHF
or 5% of the sample average in T S100m . The municipal distance from the
boundary is measured by the average distance of observed residences within
a municipality. The lower panel of Figure 5 suggests that the jump in the
rental price per square meter and even more so, the one in residual rents is
pronounced at the municipal boundary. We observe an average difference in
log rent per square meter and residual rent of 0.02 and 0.03, respectively. In
both cases, this corresponds to approximately 1% of the dependent variables’
sample average. Accordingly, the figures suggest that a 5% tax differential
results in a 1% rent difference or a 20% capitalization rate. The 95% con-
fidence intervals of the polynomial fits indicate that the discontinuities are
highly significant for all three variables.
Figure 6 visualizes the discontinuity in the share of skilled versus un-
skilled and high-income versus low-income individuals in order to shed light
on the extent of sorting across municipalities which is a prominent chan-
nel to explain the rent differential. The figures are constructed in the same
way as described above and indicate a clear discontinuity at the boundary.
For each variable the jump at the boundary is strongly significant. At the
boundary, the share of high-skilled and high-income individuals increases by
about 45 and 50% in the low-tax municipality compared to the high-tax mu-
nicipality. Conversely, the share of low-skilled and low income individuals
jumps substantially when moving from the low-tax to the high-tax side of
the boundary. In the next section we analyze the significance of these dif-
ferences and quantify the elasticities as well as the relative importance of
24An alternative and qualitatively equivalent way of displaying the discontinuities would
be to regress the variable in question on border-point fixed effects and on dummy variables
for each bin where the coefficients on these distance dummies correspond to points on the
polynomial fit displayed in our figures. We obtain very similar graphs with both approaches
and accordingly chose the continuous version.
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income sorting.
– Figures 5 and 6 here –
6.3 BDD results
Table 2 reports the coefficients and standard errors based on equation (1)
in columns (1) and (2) and equation (2) in columns (3)-(8). The table is
structured as follows. We use log rental prices per square meter as outcome
in Panel A and residual rents purged of the influence of apartment charac-
teristics in Panel B. The latter are derived as the residuals from a first stage
regression of log rents on flexible functions of the apartment characteristics
reported in Table 1.25 Uneven columns refer to specifications that include
all municipalities in the chosen sample while even columns exclude the five
largest agglomerations. This leads to 605 and 522 border points. The dis-
tance band around the border points is limited to 1 km in columns (3) and
(4). It is reduced to 600 and 300 meters in columns (5)-(6) and columns
(7)-(8), respectively. The results may be summarized as follows. First, the
elasticities carry a negative sign as expected and are statistically highly sig-
nificant. Second, the inclusion of boundary fixed effects – columns (3)-(8)
– is able to reduce the bias from the conventional hedonic approach con-
siderably and contributes substantially in terms of the models’ explanatory
power. Third, limiting the sample to close distance bands around boundaries
lowers the coefficients further. Fourth, taking residence characteristics into
account increases the estimates of the tax elasticity slightly and becomes
robust to the results in Panel A the smaller we choose the distance to the
boundary. Quantitatively, we find that an increase in the tax burden by 1%
lowers rental prices by approximately 0.5% using the conventional approach.
This effect reduces to -0.248 and to -0.258 regarding outcomes in Panel A
versus Panel B when accounting for border point fixed effects and limiting
the distance of observations to 300 meters from the boundary. It amounts
to -0.282 and -0.311 when excluding observations located in large agglom-
erations. Note also that excluding agglomerations does not systematically
affect the tax elasticity: while the effect is somewhat more pronounced when
including agglomerations in the 600 meter sample the opposite is true for
25We estimate numerous first-stage specifications and account for the fact that the pre-
mium attached to apartment characteristics may vary across cantons and may be different
in cities compared to more rural areas. Our results remain robust to these alternative
first-stages.
21
the 300 meter sample. In any case the difference in the coefficients is negli-
gible which suggests that the estimated tax elasticity is not confounded by
differences of population density or other agglomeration effects.
Overall, the size of the estimates drops by roughly 50% when accounting
for unobservable neighborhood characteristics compared to the conventional
hedonic regressions in columns (1) and (2). Moreover, border fixed effects
explain about 40% of the variation in the data.
– Table 2 about here –
6.4 MBDD results
Results based on the approach in equation (4) are shown in Table 3. The
structure of the table and the sample composition is exactly the same as
in Table 2. We additionally report the average distance between reference
residences and the counterfactual that matches observations located in the
neighboring municipality. The elasticities are remarkably similar to the ones
in Table 2, however, unobservable neighborhood characteristics seem to be
absorbed already for relatively large bandwidths. While the BDD coefficients
drop further when moving from a bandwidth of 1 km to 300 meters, the
MBDD’s coefficients are comparable to the ones in column (8) of Table 2
when using the 1 km window. Hence, due to contrasting individual residences
and assigning more weight to nearby units, the MBDD represents the more
efficient approach compared to the BDD. Moreover, the coefficients are quite
robust over all three samples. Our preferred estimates correspond to the 300
meter boundary sample which display an income tax elasticity that amounts
to roughly -0.253 in Panel A and to -0.264 in Panel B (column (5)). Again,
excluding agglomerations does not systematically affect the estimates.
– Table 3 about here –
6.5 The role of sociodemographic sorting
Apart from the direct capitalization effect of tax differentials it is evident from
Figure 6 that tax differentials lead to a sorting of households. We quantify
the share of rent differences between high- and low-tax municipalities that
is due to sociodemographic sorting by including the vector of census block
covariates summarized in Table 1 on the right-hand side of equations (2)
and (4). Table 4 reports the coefficients and standard errors from both
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equations with distance bands restricted to 600 and 300 meters. Compared
to the preferred specifications with 300 meters distance in Table 3 the tax
elasticity of rents is reduced by 20-30% and amounts to -0.181 and to -0.199
for log rents and residual rents, respectively. The corresponding specifications
disregarding local sociodemographics yield elasticities of -0.253 and -0.264 for
log rents and residual rents, respectively. This suggests that low taxes attract
high-income households and accordingly a larger housing budget which drives
up rents in addition to the direct capitalization effect.
– Table 4 about here –
7 Sensitivity
Our results have been shown to be very stable across the two approaches. In
general, matching residences to individual counterfactuals in the neighbor-
ing municipalities allows for a high degree of precision compared to the BDD
even with relatively larger windows. We test the sensitivity of these results
and in particular for the preferred MBDD specifications along the following
lines:
The role of schooling. At the municipality level in Switzerland the only
relevant public good that appears excludable is elementary schooling. As
mentioned above a large degree of homogeneity across municipalities is guar-
anteed in elementary schooling as well. The main reason for differences in
schooling should be the composition of pupils. This represents a channel for
the indirect effect of taxes on housing prices via sorting which is captured by
the chosen design. Yet, in principle the quality of elementary schools may
change discontinuously at the municipal boundary and accordingly raises
concerns about the consistency of our estimates. In order to address this
concern, we digitalized maps on school districts for cantons where applica-
ble: these are the Cantons of Zurich, Bern, Aargau, Fribourg, and Vaud.
In these cantons the boundaries of school attendance zones do not always
coincide with municipal boundaries. Accordingly we focus on observations
along boundaries that are located within the same school district yet face
different levels of income taxes. The corresponding results are summarized
in Table 5.
Since the number of municipality pairs drops considerably when using
only boundaries within the same school district we focus on the estimations
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within the 600 meter window. As has been shown in Tables 2 and 3 this band-
width is appropriate to capture neighborhood specific unobservables. Panels
A (log rent per square meter) and B (residual rents) report the coefficients
for the BDD and MBDD approaches where sociodemographic sorting is ac-
counted for in columns (2) and (4). While the coefficients’ magnitude tends to
increase somewhat when accounting for schools and using log rent per square
meter as the dependent variable, the opposite is true for residual rents. Lim-
iting the sample to units within the same school district, the benchmark
MBDD estimate increases from -0.305 to -0.420 and decreases from -0.395 to
-0.323 in the log rent and residual rent specifications, respectively. However,
in none of the specifications we can reject that the coefficients are identical for
the two samples at conventional levels of significance. Note that restricting
the sample to residences located in the same school district reduces the num-
ber of observations substantially and accordingly raises the standard errors
but most coefficients remain remarkably significant. Moreover, the estimates
reported in Table 5 are consistent with the finding that about two thirds of
the tax elasticity are due to direct capitalization effects and approximately
one third is driven by household sorting. Comparing columns (2) and (1) and
columns (4) and (3), we observe a reduction of the estimated tax elasticity
between 13 and 29% when including sociodemographic covariates.
– Table 5 about here –
Placebo discontinuities. We address the possibility that rent differentials
are erroneously attributed to tax differentials by shifting municipal bound-
aries artificially within both m and m′. For this we set new ’fake’ boundaries
which are shifted 300 meters from the true boundary point for either mu-
nicipality within a (border-point-specific) pair. Then, we reassign the newly
treated observations the low tax rate and the newly non-treated observations
the high tax rate. Finally, we estimate the BDD model using the new tax
burden variable. Table 6 reports the corresponding results for log rents per
square meter as well as residual rents and for a shift of the true bound-
ary towards the low- or high-tax municipalities. Hence, in the former case
we contaminate the control units and in the latter case we contaminate the
treated. None of the estimates in Table 6 is significant and the coefficients’
magnitudes are far from our benchmark. This falsification exercise adds fur-
ther confidence in our results as it shows that spatial trends in unobservables
can be effectively eliminated by spatial differencing.
– Table 6 about here –
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Functional form misspecification. In line with most regression disconti-
nuity approaches, we account for spatial trends that lead to average rent
differences across boundaries by adding flexible forms of distance or coordi-
nates to equation (4):
rimbt − ri′m′bt = δ(τmt − τm′t) + f(limbt)− f(li′m′bt) + (νimbt − νi′m′bt), (5)
where f(limbt) and f(li′m′bt) include (i) a cubic polynomial function of distance
to b, and (ii) the geographic coordinates of locations. Results are presented
in columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 and are directly comparable to the ones
shown in column (5) of Table 3. The coefficients are nearly identical which
confirms the robustness of the estimated tax elasticities to the inclusion of
flexible forms of distance to the boundary. Note that spatial trends across
boundaries have been taken into account already by weighting the regressions
using the inverse distance.
Furthermore, nonlinearities of tax rates may apply. The MBDD approach
identifies the coefficient on (τmt − τm′t) which reflects the tax benefit from
living in municipality m compared to living in municipality m′. For some
municipality pairs the tax differential is only minor and may not lead to an
aggregate price response, at least as long as the differential is below individ-
ual fixed migration costs. Similarly, it may be the case that for sufficiently
high levels of taxes all mobile households leave a municipality and only the
elderly or other tax-inelastic groups remain. In this scenario, the marginal
effect of a tax increase will be negligible. Accordingly, it seems plausible to
expect a nonlinear relationship between rents and local income taxes. We
approach the potential nonlinear response by (i) including a quadratic term
of the tax differential in equation (4); and by (ii) focusing on comparisons of
observations i and their counterfactual i′ where the tax differential exceeds
the median tax differential in the sample, amounting to 731 CHF. Columns
(3) and (4) suggest that both approaches leave previous results qualitatively
unaffected. At the same time column (3) provides some indication that the
elasticity diminishes with high tax differentials.
Endogeneity of municipality boundaries and taxes. Due to municipality
mergers, the data are georeferenced by year. However, if municipality merg-
ers are more or less likely for neighbors with large tax differentials this would
induce a selection bias. We address the possibility that the tax differential
is simultaneously determined with the tax base by dropping unstable mu-
nicipal boundaries as a robustness check. Hence, we focus on the subset of
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municipalities that maintained their boundaries unchanged over the entire
time horizon in column (5) of Table 7.
A further concern relates to pre-existing spatial differences in the compo-
sition of the population which led to the establishment of municipal bound-
aries along the current lines and renders taxes endogenous. It seems very
unlikely that the population composition featured discontinuities in the ab-
sence of municipal boundaries and natural irregularities as the costs of social
interactions tend to be a smooth function of distance. Of course, the con-
tinuity assumption in the absence of municipal boundaries does not hold
if natural geographic barriers such as rivers or mountains prevail. We ad-
dress this concern by dropping boundary segments coinciding with natural
irregularities from the sample throughout all regressions. Moreover, we in-
clude municipality fixed effects in MBDD specifications. Thereby, we absorb
all time-invariant differences in the population composition of municipali-
ties and identify the tax elasticity exclusively from variation in the level of
taxes over time. The corresponding results are reported in column (6) of
Table 7 and confirm our results. Exploiting exclusively variation over time
reduces the efficiency of the estimates but the coefficients remain significant
and almost identical in magnitude. Note that municipality fixed effects cap-
ture the average sociodemographics which determine the preferences of the
electorate but they do not reflect the distribution of households within mu-
nicipalities and in particular the sorting at the boundary as captured by our
sociodemographic covariates. Thus, we still observe a reduction of the coef-
ficient by about one third when adding the sociodemographic covariates to
the specification with municipality fixed effects.
– Table 7 about here –
Heterogeneity in households and residences. As a final sensitivity check we
study the heterogeneity of the tax elasticity with regard to different household
and residence types. In column (7) of Table 7 we report the results for a
representative married couple with two children and annual income of 100
tsd. CHF. We obtained similar results for four additional income choices of
80, 150, 200, and 400 tsd. CHF.26 The point estimates remain qualitatively
unchanged compared to our benchmark. This can be explained by the fact
that the tax progression across income groups and household types is fairly
stable within cantons. Yet, we observe heterogenous responses to income
26These results and a battery of further specifications are made available in an online
appendix.
26
taxes for different residence types: we split the sample into quartiles based
on apartment size and estimated equation (4) separately for each of the four
quartiles. Table 8 reports the corresponding results and shows throughout all
specifications an increased responsiveness of smaller apartments. This points
to an increased mobility of smaller households compared to larger ones and
is consistent with household size as a determinant of migration cost.
– Table 8 about here –
8 Concluding remarks
Local income taxes directly capitalize in housing prices and indirectly affect
the latter through a spatial sorting of households according to income. The
degree of capitalization and spatial sorting is of key importance for the opti-
mal design of many policy measures as well as for the configuration of fiscal
federalism in general. Previous studies have been confined to property taxes
and were complicated by unobservable confounding factors such as hetero-
geneous household preferences, environmental amenities, and the quality of
local public goods and services. In particular, conventional hedonic regres-
sion approaches are likely to produce inconsistent results due to the omission
of relevant factors that are both correlated with income taxes and directly
influence the housing market. This paper corrects for unobservable location
characteristics and disentangles the direct capitalization effect and the role
of household sorting using comprehensive apartment/household-level data
on rents and sociodemographic characteristics. We identify the income tax
elasticity using a boundary discontinuity design and alternatively a matching
approach. In both cases, we estimate an income tax elasticity of about 0.26
which amounts to about one half of the estimate from conventional hedonic
regressions and thus points to the important role of unobservable location
characteristics. Moreover, our results show that about one third of the over-
all effect is due to household sorting whereas two thirds can be attributed to
direct capitalization of fiscal variables in housing prices.
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Tables and figures
Figure 1: Distribution of Residences
Note: Each dot refers to one residence for which we observe a posting containing information
on the rent per square meter, and on all covariates listed in Table 1. The lower map focuses on
the Canton of Zurich.
Figure 2: Income tax Burden across Swiss Municipalities
Income tax burden (CHF)
4806 - 12782
12783 - 14379
14380 - 15126
15127 - 15841
15842 - 19841
Income tax burden (CHF)Canton of Zurich
8741 - 9849
9850 - 10523
10524 - 10908
10909 - 11197
11198 - 11390
Note: The colors refer to the quintiles of the distribution of income tax burden in Switzerland
and in the Canton of Zurich. Lighter colors correspond to lower tax burden, darker colors to
higher tax burden. The tax burden is calculated for a single household with an annual gross
income of 100,000 CHF in the year 2012.
Figure 3: Rents across Swiss Municipalities
Average rent per sqm (CHF)
5 - 15
16 - 17
18 - 19
20 - 22
23 - 74
Average rent per sqm (CHF) Canton of Zurich
14 - 19
20 - 21
22 - 23
24 - 26
27 - 41
Note: The colors refer to the quintiles of the distribution of rents per square meter in 2012
where the upper map plots Switzerland and the lower map focuses on the Canton of Zurich.
Lighter colors correspond to lower rents, darker colors to higher rents. We consider only border
points that are assigned at least 2 residences. Municipalities that do not feature a border point
with sufficient observations are dropped from the analysis and are marked white areas in the
above maps.
Figure 4: Residences and Border Points – Example: Zol-
likon/Ku¨snacht
Note: Each dot refers to one residence for which we observe a posting containing information on
the rent per square meter, and on all covariates listed in Table 1. The colors of the dots indicate
the border point that residences were assigned to on the basis of the minimum distance. Note
that Zollikon and Ku¨snacht are two municipalities in the Canton of Zurich which are situated
at the lake of Zurich. Residences marked in green (border point 1) are very close to the lake
shore while residences marked in red (border point 3) are on a hill.
Figure 5: Taxes, Rents, and the Municipal Border
Distribution of Residences Income tax Burden
Rent per square meter Residual rent
Note: Treated units (lower taxes) are assigned positive distances while control units (higher
taxes) are assigned negative distances. We use pooled data for 2005-2012. The figures show
local averages of variables in equally sized bins of 100 meters which are plotted against the
distance from the respective boundary point within 1 km. Rents per square meter and residual
rents are measured in logarithmic terms, and the tax burden in absolute terms. All variables
are measured in terms of the deviation from the respective border-point-year average. We fit
linear predictions for income tax burden and quadratic functions for rent per square meter
and residual rent on both sides of the threshold and display the corresponding 95% confidence
intervals.
Figure 6: Taxes, sociodemographic Variables, and the Municipal
Border
Share of high-skilled individuals Share of low-skilled individuals
Share of high-income individuals Share of low-income individuals
Note: Treated units (lower taxes) are assigned positive distances while control units (higher
taxes) are assigned negative distances. The shares are computed on the basis of the population
in 1 × 1 km grids where we require a minimum population of 50. Each residence i is assigned
the sociodemographics of the grid g it is located in. For more details on the classification of
high- (low-) income (skill) groups see Appendix B. The figures show local averages of variables
in equally sized bins of 100 meters which are plotted against the distance from the respective
boundary point within 1 km. Outcomes are measured in shares and as the deviation from the
respective boundary-year average. We fit quadratic functions on both sides of the threshold
and display the corresponding 95% confidence intervals.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Full data set Boundary sub-sample
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Main Variables
Rent/m2 Ri 21.140 6.261 22.247 6.430
Tax burden TS100m 13,875.760 2,409.827 13,849.775 2,497.446
Distance (meter) Dib - - 538.177 244
Sociodemographic Covariates
Share of high-incomeg 0.124 0.061 0.139 0.074
Share of low-incomeg 0.111 0.040 0.112 0.046
Share of high-skilledg 0.100 0.070 0.117 0.077
Share of low-skilledg 0.302 0.088 0.294 0.101
Average ageg 39.580 3.496 40.354 3.499
Share of foreignersg 0.239 0.115 0.257 0.123
Share of unemployedg 0.032 0.017 0.032 0.015
Share of commutersg 0.439 0.049 0.433 0.042
Populationg 3604.573 3589.298 2811.350 2038.478
Residence Covariates
Roomsi 3.528 1.324 3.507 1.325
Agei 32.585 35.746 40.354 3.499
Floori 1.933 1.696 1.916 1.755
Parqueti 0.376 0.484 0.367 0.482
Cellari 0.175 0.380 0.175 0.380
Attici 0.041 0.199 0.040 0.195
Gardeni 0.098 0.297 0.105 0.307
Terracei 0.078 0.268 0.077 0.266
Balconyi 0.653 0.476 0.667 0.471
Lifti 0.370 0.483 0.347 0.476
Renovatedi 0.078 0.269 0.081 0.273
Carporti 0.108 0.310 0.098 0.298
Lake viewi 0.013 0.113 0.035 0.184
Furnishedi 0.042 0.201 0.065 0.247
Bathtubi 0.040 0.195 0.045 0.207
Dryeri 0.048 0.214 0.042 0.200
Washingmi 0.058 0.234 0.048 0.214
Dishwashi 0.155 0.362 0.160 0.366
Ceramicstovei 0.204 0.403 0.213 0.409
Openkitcheni 0.049 0.215 0.043 0.202
Floorheati 0.012 0.111 0.010 0.099
Fireplacei 0.050 0.218 0.061 0.240
Municipalities M 1,989 211
Grids G 8,399 701
Border points B 6,193 190
Residences I 2,516,518 151,011
Notes: The summary statistics correspond to data pooled over the period 2005-2012. We dropped obser-
vations with a rent of less than 5 CHF or more than 52 CHF per square meter, and observations with
missing information on rents, the number of rooms, and square meters. This diminishes the sample from
about 3.5mn. observations to 2,516,518 observations in the full dataset. The boundary sub-sample consists
of all residences that could be assigned to a border point b which features at least 2 observations on both
sides of the boundary and within a distance of 300 meters. Accordingly, the municipality composition
remains stable when restricting the boundary sub-sample to residences at maximum distances of 600 and
300 meters. All border points which correspond to geographic barriers (e.g. rivers) or linguistic barriers
have been dropped. Moreover, we drop municipality pairs with a tax differential of less than 100 CHF
and we keep only residences that lie within a 1× 1 km grid g with a population of at least 50 individuals.
The latter should ensure that the sociodemographic information is representative of the neighborhood.
Tax burden and rents are measured in CHF. TS100m refers to the tax burden of a single household with an
annual income of 100,000 CHF. For a detailed definition of the sociodemographic variables and the tax
burden see Appendices A and B.
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Table 3: MBDD for municipal taxes and rental prices 2005-2012
A. Log rent per m2
1km Sample 0.6km Sample 0.3km Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tax elasticity -0.284∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗ -0.305∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗ -0.253∗∗∗ -0.257∗∗
(0.052) (0.073) (0.067) (0.084) (0.097) (0.116)
Obs. 151,011 120,439 89,058 75,218 30,980 26,470
No. b,t 605 522 605 522 605 522
Agglom. Yes No Yes No Yes No
adj. R2 0.015 0.011 0.016 0.012 0.009 0.008
Avg.dist 1.019 0.988 0.717 0.710 0.411 0.419
B. Residual rent
1km Sample 0.6km Sample 0.3km Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tax elasticity -0.389∗∗∗ -0.363∗∗∗ -0.395∗∗∗ -0.348∗∗∗ -0.264∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗
(0.051) (0.068) (0.066) (0.080) (0.090) (0.103)
Obs. 151,011 120,439 89,058 75,218 30,980 26,470
No. b,t 605 522 605 522 605 522
Agglom. Yes No Yes No Yes No
adj. R2 0.025 0.019 0.025 0.018 0.010 0.009
Avg.dist 1.019 0.988 0.717 0.710 0.411 0.419
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The sample covers the
years 2005-2012. Standard errors are clustered at the border-point-year level. All regressions include year
fixed effects and are estimated by WLS. The reference observations are spatially differenced with respect
to a counterfactual outcome (according to equation (3)) at 605/522 border points. Weights correspond
to the inverse distance to the counterfactual (the average distance between the reference unit and all
residences used to construct the counterfactual residence). Each specification is reported for a sample
of all observations in uneven columns and one excluding the 5 largest agglomerations in even columns.
Residual rents are obtained from a regression of the log rent per square meter on the residence covariates
listed in Table 1 and interactions between them.
Table 4: Sociodemographic sorting
A. Log rent per m2
BDD MBDD
0.6km 0.3km 0.6km 0.3km
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tax elasticity -0.333∗∗∗ -0.226∗ -0.244∗∗∗ -0.181∗
(0.070) (0.126) (0.076) (0.108)
Obs. 89,058 30,980 89,058 30,980
No. b,t 605 605 605 605
Socio-demog. Yes Yes Yes Yes
adj. R2 0.524 0.553 0.052 0.048
Avg.dist .717 .411
B. Residual rent
BDD MBDD
0.6km 0.3km 0.6km 0.3km
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tax elasticity -0.405∗∗∗ -0.255∗∗ -0.308∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗
(0.068) (0.102) (0.069) (0.097)
Obs. 89,058 30,980 89,058 30,980
No. b,t 605 605 605 605
Socio-demog. Yes Yes Yes Yes
adj. R2 0.486 0.526 0.055 0.037
Avg.dist .717 .411
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The sample covers
the years 2005-2012 and includes agglomerations. Standard errors are clustered at the border-point-year
level. Columns (1) and (2) refer to BDD estimates whereas columns (3) and (4) correspond to the MBDD
specifications and are estimated by WLS. Weights correspond to the inverse distance to the counterfactual
(the average distance between the reference unit and all residences used to construct the counterfactual
residence). Residual rents are obtained from a regression of the log rent per square meter on the residence
covariates listed in Table 1 and interactions between them. We include linear terms of all sociodemographic
covariates listed in Table 1. These variables are computed on the basis of the population of 1×1 km grids.
We locate each residence i in the grid and assign the corresponding sociodemographic covariates.
Table 5: (M)BDD with schooling
A. Log rent per m2
BDD MBDD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tax elasticity -0.498∗∗ -0.433∗ -0.420∗ -0.306#
(0.227) (0.226) (0.226) (0.209)
Obs. 21,014 21,014 21,014 21,014
No. b,t 151 151 151 151
Socio-demog. No Yes No Yes
adj. R2 0.434 0.444 0.028 0.103
Avg.dist 0.689 0.689
B. Residual rent
BDD MBDD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tax elasticity -0.404∗∗∗ -0.285∗ -0.323∗ -0.244#
(0.144) (0.154) (0.164) (0.157)
Obs. 21,014 21,014 21,014 21,014
No. b,t 151 151 151 151
Socio-demog. No Yes No Yes
adj. R2 0.351 0.359 0.025 0.088
Avg.dist 0.689 0.689
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, # denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% level, respectively. The sample
covers the years 2005-2012. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality-year level. All regressions
are based on the sample with agglomerations and a distance limited to 600 meters from the boundary
point. This yields 150 border-point-year groups of units that lie within the same school district but face
different municipal income taxes. Columns (1) and (2) refer to the BDD estimates whereas columns (3)
and (4) correspond to the MBDD specifications which are estimates by WLS. Weights correspond to the
inverse distance to the counterfactual (the average distance between the reference unit and all residences
used to construct the counterfactual residence). Residual rents are obtained from a regression of the
log rent per square meter on the residence covariates listed in Table 1 and interactions between them.
Each specification is reported without (in uneven columns) and with (in even columns) sociodemographic
covariates. These are listed in Table 1.
Table 6: Placebo tests
Border shifted towards treated Border shifted towards control
Log rent/m2 Residual rent Log rent/m2 Residual rent
Tax elasticity 0.152 -0.041 0.104 -0.022
(0.110) (0.086) (0.089) (0.089)
Obs. 54,472 57,548 54,472 57,548
No. b,t 522 522 522 522
adj. R2 0.551 0.514 0.519 0.498
All standard errors are clustered at the border-point-year level. Regressions are based on the sample
without agglomerations and a distance limited to 600 meters from the border point.
T
ab
le
7:
S
e
n
si
t
iv
it
y
(I
)
A
.
L
o
g
r
e
n
t
p
e
r
m
2
D
is
ta
n
ce
C
o
o
rd
in
a
te
s
t-
sq
u
a
re
d
t-
M
ed
ia
n
S
ta
b
le
M
u
n
ic
ip
a
li
ty
F
E
M
a
rr
ie
d
&
2
C
h
il
d
re
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
T
a
x
el
a
st
ic
it
y
-0
.2
6
2
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
3
8
∗∗
-0
.2
6
2
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
7
2
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
3
9
∗∗
-0
.2
9
4
∗
-0
.2
5
4
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
9
6
)
(0
.0
9
6
)
(0
.0
9
5
)
(0
.0
9
7
)
(0
.1
0
1
)
(0
.1
6
4
)
(0
.0
9
7
)
T
a
x
el
a
st
ic
it
y
2
1
.0
7
5
∗∗
(0
.4
6
4
)
O
b
s.
3
0
,9
8
0
3
0
,9
8
0
3
0
,9
8
0
1
3
,4
8
1
2
8
,1
2
9
3
0
,9
8
0
3
0
,9
8
0
N
o
.
b,
t
6
0
5
6
0
5
6
0
5
2
4
8
5
9
4
6
0
5
6
0
5
a
d
j.
R
2
0
.0
1
4
0
.0
1
4
0
.0
1
2
0
.0
2
3
0
.0
1
0
0
.2
1
3
0
.0
0
9
A
v
g
.d
is
t
0
.4
1
1
0
.4
1
1
0
.4
1
1
0
.4
1
1
0
.4
1
1
0
.4
1
1
0
.4
1
1
B
.
R
e
si
d
u
a
l
r
e
n
t
D
is
ta
n
ce
C
o
o
rd
in
a
te
s
t-
sq
u
a
re
d
t-
M
ed
ia
n
S
ta
b
le
M
u
n
ic
ip
a
li
ty
F
E
M
a
rr
ie
d
&
2
C
h
il
d
re
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
T
a
x
el
a
st
ic
it
y
-0
.2
7
7
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
4
6
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
7
2
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
7
3
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
4
2
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
9
8
∗∗
-0
.2
6
4
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
9
0
)
(0
.0
8
6
)
(0
.0
8
8
)
(0
.0
9
1
)
(0
.0
9
3
)
(0
.1
5
0
)
(0
.0
9
0
)
T
a
x
el
a
st
ic
it
y
2
0
.9
9
4
∗∗
(0
.4
4
4
)
O
b
s.
3
0
,9
8
0
3
0
,9
8
0
3
0
,9
8
0
1
3
,4
8
1
2
8
,1
2
9
3
0
,9
8
0
3
0
,9
8
0
N
o
.
b,
t
6
0
5
6
0
5
6
0
5
2
4
8
5
9
4
6
0
5
6
0
5
a
d
j.
R
2
0
.0
1
5
0
.0
1
7
0
.0
1
3
0
.0
2
6
0
.0
1
0
0
.1
9
1
0
.0
1
0
A
v
g
.d
is
t
0
.4
1
1
0
.4
1
1
0
.4
1
1
0
.4
1
1
0
.4
1
1
0
.4
1
1
0
.4
1
1
∗∗
∗ ,
∗∗
,
∗
d
en
o
te
st
a
ti
st
ic
a
l
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
%
,
5
%
,
a
n
d
1
0
%
le
v
el
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
co
v
er
s
th
e
y
ea
rs
2
0
0
5
-2
0
1
2
.
A
ll
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
b
o
rd
er
-p
o
in
t-
y
ea
r
le
v
el
.
A
ll
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
cl
u
d
e
y
ea
r
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
a
n
d
a
re
es
ti
m
a
te
d
b
y
W
L
S
.
T
h
e
re
fe
re
n
ce
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
a
re
sp
a
ti
a
ll
y
d
iff
er
en
ce
d
w
it
h
re
sp
ec
t
to
a
co
u
n
te
rf
a
ct
u
a
l
o
u
tc
o
m
e
(a
cc
o
rd
in
g
to
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
(3
))
a
t
6
0
5
/
5
2
2
b
o
rd
er
p
o
in
ts
.
W
ei
g
h
ts
co
rr
es
p
o
n
d
to
th
e
in
v
er
se
d
is
ta
n
ce
to
th
e
co
u
n
te
rf
a
ct
u
a
l
(t
h
e
a
v
er
a
g
e
d
is
ta
n
ce
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
re
fe
re
n
ce
u
n
it
a
n
d
a
ll
re
si
d
en
ce
s
u
se
d
to
co
n
st
ru
ct
th
e
co
u
n
te
rf
a
ct
u
a
l
re
si
d
en
ce
).
R
es
id
u
a
l
re
n
ts
a
re
o
b
ta
in
ed
fr
o
m
a
re
g
re
ss
io
n
o
f
th
e
lo
g
re
n
t
p
er
sq
u
a
re
m
et
er
o
n
th
e
re
si
d
en
ce
co
v
a
ri
a
te
s
li
st
ed
in
T
a
b
le
1
a
n
d
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
s
b
et
w
ee
n
th
em
.
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
s
a
re
b
a
se
d
o
n
a
d
is
ta
n
ce
li
m
it
ed
to
3
0
0
m
et
er
s
fr
o
m
th
e
b
o
rd
er
p
o
in
t.
C
o
lu
m
n
(1
)
in
cl
u
d
es
a
cu
b
ic
fu
n
ct
io
n
o
f
d
is
ta
n
ce
fr
o
m
th
e
b
o
rd
er
p
o
in
t,
co
lu
m
n
(2
)
in
cl
u
d
es
x
-
a
n
d
y
-c
o
o
rd
in
a
te
s,
co
lu
m
n
(3
)
in
cl
u
d
es
a
sq
u
a
re
d
te
rm
o
f
th
e
ta
x
d
iff
er
en
ti
a
l,
co
lu
m
n
(4
)
co
m
p
a
re
s
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
w
it
h
a
b
o
v
e
m
ed
ia
n
ta
x
d
iff
er
en
ti
a
l
(i
.e
.,
>
7
3
1
C
H
F
);
co
lu
m
n
(5
)
sh
o
w
s
th
e
re
su
lt
s
b
a
se
d
o
n
a
sa
m
p
le
o
f
m
u
n
ic
ip
a
li
ti
es
th
a
t
a
re
st
a
b
le
o
v
er
ti
m
e;
co
lu
m
n
(6
)
in
cl
u
d
es
m
u
n
ic
ip
a
li
ty
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
in
a
d
d
it
io
n
to
b
o
rd
er
-p
o
in
t-
y
ea
r
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
;
a
n
d
co
lu
m
n
(7
)
fo
cu
se
s
o
n
m
a
rr
ie
d
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s
w
it
h
tw
o
ch
il
d
re
n
a
n
d
a
n
a
n
n
u
a
l
g
ro
ss
in
co
m
e
o
f
1
0
0
,0
0
0
C
H
F
.
Table 8: Sensitivity (II)
A. Log rent per m2
1. Quartile 2. Quartile 3. Quartile 4. Quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tax elasticity -0.357∗∗ -0.366∗∗∗ -0.274∗∗ -0.189
(0.158) (0.126) (0.117) (0.122)
Obs. 8,055 8,239 7,806 6,880
No. b,t 520 513 547 540
adj. R2 0.017 0.023 0.019 0.013
Avg.dist 0.411 0.411 0.411 0.411
B. Residual rent
1. Quartile 2. Quartile 3. Quartile 4. Quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tax elasticity -0.414∗∗∗ -0.291∗∗ -0.280∗∗∗ -0.160
(0.130) (0.137) (0.103) (0.120)
Obs. 8,055 8,239 7,806 6,880
No. b,t 520 513 547 540
adj. R2 0.029 0.013 0.023 0.011
Avg.dist 0.411 0.411 0.411 0.411
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The sample covers
the years 2005-2012. All standard errors are clustered at the border-point-year level. All regressions
include year fixed effects and are estimated by WLS. The reference observations are spatially differenced
with respect to a counterfactual outcome (according to equation (3)) at 605/522 border points. Weights
correspond to the inverse distance to the counterfactual (the average distance between the reference unit
and all residences used to construct the counterfactual residence). Residual rents are obtained from a
regression of the log rent per square meter on the residence covariates listed in Table 1 and interactions
between them. Regressions are based on a distance limited to 300 meters from the border point. Columns
(1)-(4) show the results for quartiles of apartment size (1st qu.: 15-61, 2nd qu.: 61.5-82, 3rd qu.: 82.3-107,
4th qu.: 107.3-230 square meters).
Appendix A: Data on municipal taxes
There are numerous differences in the calculation of taxes across the 26 can-
tons. These include differences in deductions, in the cantonal tax rates (pro-
gressive versus flat rate), the character of the municipal and church tax rates
(percentage, multiple), and the tax base (Einfache Steuer, cantonal tax, tax-
able income).
The total income tax from cantonal, municipal and church taxes was cal-
culated by canton and year (2005-2012) as follows. We used figures published
by Eidgeno¨ssische Steuerverwaltung (ESTV) for all municipalities with at
least 2,000 inhabitants before 2010 and full information for all municipalities
for 2010-12 to trace back the so-called canton-specific Einfache Steuer which
sets the basis for the calculation of the local tax burden. For most cantons,
the formula is as follows.
Base =
1
G
G∑
g=1
Tax− Poll tax
tcant + tmun + tchurch
,
where Base is the Einfache Steuer, G denotes the number of municipalities,
Tax is the local tax burden published by ESTV, Poll tax is a canton- or
municipality-specific poll tax, tcant is the cantonal, tmun the municipal,
and tchurch the church tax rate.
We used the church tax rate according to the majority confession by
municipality using 2000 census data (BFS). All calculations are done by
year and canton. We obtained the income tax as the sum of the three and
add the poll tax if applicable for all years 2005-2012. The income tax was
calculated for different levels of annual gross income (80, 100, 150, 200, 400
tsd. CHF) and for two different types of households (single households and
married households with two children). The sources were as follows: cantonal
tax rates (ESTV), municipal tax rates (cantonal tax or statistical offices),
church tax rates (cantonal tax or statistical offices or local parishes), poll
tax (cantonal tax offices). The latter were levied by the Cantons of Geneva,
Lucerne, Nidwalden, Schaffhausen, Solothurn, Uri, Vaud, and Zurich. They
differed by municipality in the Cantons of Vaud and Solothurn. We generally
neglected federal income taxes (note that these are irrelevant anyway as we
focus solely on within-canton comparisons).
Exceptions are explained in the following. Calculations were adjusted for
the Cantons of Appenzell-Innerrhoden and Graubu¨nden, where municipal
taxes were expressed in % of the cantonal tax, for the Canton of Valais,
where the church tax was expressed in % of the municipal tax, and for the
Canton of Jura, where the church tax was expressed in % of the cantonal
tax. Base was then multiplied accordingly by the cantonal, municipal, and
church tax rates.
In case municipalities within canton reported non-uniform and positive
school and/or district tax rates (Schwyz, Zug, Appenzell-Innerrhoden, Thur-
gau), we added these tax rates to the municipal tax rate. Note that mu-
nicipalities were always a subset of districts. Three municipalities did not
levy income taxes but instead only a school tax (Einsiedeln, Ku¨ssnacht am
Rigi, Gersau) from 2010 onwards. Only 38 administrative municipalities
in 2 cantons (Appenzell-Innerrhoden and Thurgau) consisted of more than
one (at most 5, on average 2.2) school municipalities and reported different
school taxes within the administrative municipality (note that there is more
municipalities but these do not charge varying school taxes).
In the Canton of Uri, taxes were calculated as a percentage of the taxable
income until 2008. To obtain the tax burden, we first regressed the tax
burden minus the poll tax on the municipal and the church tax rate and on a
constant and obtained the Einfache Steuer from the latter in all years before
2009. This procedure is in line with Parchet (2012). We estimated these
regressions by year. We then calculated the total income tax burden from
cantonal, municipal and church taxes for all municipalities from the following
formula:
Tax = Poll tax + Base× tcant + taxable income× (tmun + tchurch).
The taxable income was obtained by subtracting deductions for public and
private insurance and pension contributions, business and general expenses.
We assumed a typical number of deductions to proxy the taxable income
and in a next step, calculated the total tax burden due. Specifically, deduc-
tions for public insurance schemes were 7.1% of the gross annual income (5%,
1.1%, and 1% thereof for public pension, unemployment, and accident insur-
ance, respectively), resulting in net income. Deductions for private pension
schemes amounted to 6,192 CHF in the years 2005 and 2006, and to 6,365
in 2007 and 2008. In addition, a general insurance deduction of 1,500 CHF
was subtracted. Deductions for general expenses amounted to 2000 CHF.
Finally, we deducted business expenses by utilizing the minimum of 3% of
the net income and 3800 CHF.
For the Canton of Basel-Stadt, we used the income tax burden as pub-
lished by ESTV in all years and for all three municipalities of the canton.
Appendix B: Sociodemographic data
Sociodemographic variables stem from the 2000 micro census and were kindly
provided by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (BFS). We obtained xy-
coordinate-based individual data (anonymized) that we aggregate within spa-
tial grids of 1× 1 km. The variables are constructed as follows.
Share of high-income. The share of high-income individuals in the total
laborforce (working plus nonworking population). To construct this vari-
able, we used information on socio-professional categories as defined by BFS.
High-income individuals are defined as individuals whose job function is top
management, independent professions (e.g. physicians, lawyers, architects),
other self-employed excluding agriculture, academic jobs, and managerial
staff (Oberstes Management, Freie Berufe, Andere Selbsta¨ndige ohne Land-
wirtschaft, Akademische Berufe und oberes Kader). We calculate the sum of
high-income individuals within the grid and divide it by the total laborforce
within the grid to obtain the share.
Share of low-income. The share of low-income individuals in the total
laborforce. Low-income individuals are defined as individuals occupying non-
skilled job functions (ungelernte Angestellte und Arbeiter). The calculation
of the share is otherwise analogous to the share of high-income.
Share of high-skilled. The share of high-skilled individuals in the adult
population. To construct this variable, we used information on the highest
completed educational degree. High-skilled individuals are defined as indi-
viduals with a college of higher education or university degree. We calculate
the sum of high-skilled individuals within the grid and divide it by all indi-
viduals (excluding missing observations, school-aged, or younger) within the
grid to obtain the share.
Share of low-skilled. The share of low-skilled individuals in the adult pop-
ulation. To construct this variable, we used information on the highest com-
pleted educational degree. Low-skilled individuals are defined as individuals
without an educational degree and completed compulsory schooling. The
calculation of the share is otherwise analogous to the share of high-skilled.
Average age. The average of the age of all individuals within the grid.
Share of foreigners. The share of non-native born in the total popula-
tion. We calculate the sum of foreigners within the grid and divide it by the
population within the grid.
Share of unemployed. The share of unemployed in the total laborforce.
We calculate the sum of unemployed within the grid and divide it by the
total laborforce within the grid.
Share of commuters. The share of commuters in the total adult popula-
tion. We calculate the sum of commuters within the grid and divide it by
the population within the grid.
Population. The total number of individuals in the census (7,452,075).
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